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‘Framing’ Chinese hi-tech firms: A political
and legal critique
Colin Hawes*
Governments in many countries, including the United States, Australia and
Canada, have been highly suspicious of the political motives of Chinese
business firms seeking to invest in resource industries and infrastructure
development overseas. This article uses the case of the Chinese hi-tech
firm, Huawei Technologies, to demonstrate the tendency of the United
States and other governments to frame their analysis based on unreliable or
biased sources and outdated understanding of the Chinese legal and
corporate environment. The inevitable results of such misguided framing will
be schizophrenic foreign policy decisions, increased international tensions,
higher costs for consumers, and retaliation by the Chinese government
against international firms doing business in China.
In October 2012, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the US
Congress (the committee) held hearings about two Chinese hi-tech companies,
Huawei Technologies and ZTE, and produced a scathing report (the PSC
Report), which concluded: ‘Based on available classified and unclassified
information, Huawei and ZTE cannot be trusted to be free of foreign state
influence and thus pose a security threat to the United States and to our
systems.’1 The report recommended that the US government should block
acquisitions, takeovers, or mergers involving Huawei and ZTE, that US
government contractors should not use Huawei’s or ZTE’s equipment,
including in component parts, and private-sector US telecom firms should be
strongly discouraged from buying products from these two companies.2
The problem is, virtually all the evidence that the committee relied on to
come to this conclusion is either incorrect, misleading, or exaggerated. This
article gives just a few examples of these errors: more detailed accounts can
be found elsewhere.3 Our main focus is on Huawei Technologies because it is
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1 M Rogers and D Ruppersberger, ‘Investigative Report on the US National Security Issues
Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE’, 8 October 2012,
pp vi–vii, at <http://intelligence.house.gov/legislation/committee-reports> (accessed
31 March 2015) (PSC Report). See also videos and transcripts of testimony given at the
hearings into this matter at <http://intelligence.house.gov/hearing/investigation-security-
threat-posed-chinese-telecommunications-companies-huawei-and-zte-0> (accessed
31 March 2015)..
2 PSC Report, ibid, p vi.
3 The most detailed critical analysis of the PSC Report can be found in E Anderson,
Sinophobia: The Huawei Story, Kindle Books, 2013, Ch 4. Anderson also collects many of
the relevant English-language sources on Huawei’s political challenges, and concludes that
there is no convincing evidence of Huawei’s connections with the Chinese military or
involvement in any kind of activities that would threaten US national security. For a detailed
account of Huawei’s corporate culture, see C Hawes, The Chinese Transformation of
Corporate Culture, Routledge, Abingdon, UK, 2012, pp 37–43, 117–28. And for balanced
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the most successful Chinese hi-tech firm to develop an international market,
and it has faced the most serious political and media criticism. But the
problems faced by Huawei are shared by its Chinese competitor ZTE, and will
stymie any Chinese firm if its business directly or indirectly touches on
national security issues.
To point out the inaccuracies in the PSC Report is not to downplay the
harmful impacts of cyber-spying or the emerging risks of cyber-warfare.
Rather, it is to question the tendency of the United States and other
governments to ‘frame’ their analysis based on unreliable or biased sources
and outdated understanding of the Chinese legal and corporate environment,
thereby drawing simplistic and erroneous conclusions about Chinese business
enterprises. The inevitable result of such framing will be increased
international tensions, higher costs for consumers, and retaliation by the
Chinese government against American and other international firms doing
business in China.
Before offering a critique of the PSC Report’s findings about Huawei, the
article will first define the concept of framing and briefly introduce some of
the typical frames of reference that have been constructed by Chinese
commentators, opinion leaders and academics to interpret Chinese
government and corporate behaviour, exerting a strong influence on US and
other Western government policymakers. We will also note some actions of
the Chinese government and military that may have reinforced negative
attitudes to Chinese hi-tech firms. In the concluding analysis, the article will
argue that negative views of Chinese hi-tech firms represented by the PSC
Report and associated academic and media commentary are the inevitable
result of a vicious cycle of counter-responses rooted in the very human
tendency to frame the ‘other’ as an actual or potential enemy.
Frames for interpreting China to the West
The concept of framing is a well-known one in the field of communication and
media studies. Jim A Kuypers provides a clear definition:
Framing . . . is the process whereby communicators act — consciously or not — to
construct a particular point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to
be viewed in a particular manner, with some facts made more or less noticeable
(even ignored) than others . . . [Frames] induce us to filter our perceptions of the
world in particular ways.4
In their public announcements, politicians frequently seek to ‘frame’
statements to focus on positive results, whereas their opponents and hostile
media commentators will find ways to ‘reframe’ the analysis to point out the
negative impacts of government policies and decisions. Sometimes framing is
more sinister, an attempt by law enforcement officials or unprincipled
accounts in Chinese about the company, see D Cheng and L Liu, Huawei zhenxiang [The
Truth about Huawei], Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, Beijing, 2004; and G Zhang, Huawei
si zhang lian [The four faces of Huawei], Jingji chubanshe, Guangdong, 2007.
4 See ‘Framing Analysis’ in The Art of Rhetorical Criticism, J A Kuypers (Ed), Pearson,
Boston, 2005, p 187.
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competitors to cook up false evidence that ensures their opponents will face
a guilty verdict or at least be put on the defensive.5
But the frames through which people view the world may be adopted
unconsciously, resulting from years of acculturation in a specific environment
rather than from intentional rhetorical strategies or corrupt practices. As the
cultural anthropologist Gregory Bateson put it: ‘There may be no explicit
verbal reference to the frame, and the subject may have no consciousness of
it.’6 And sociologist Erving Goffman noted the impossibility of doing away
with frames altogether: ‘It seems we can hardly glance at anything without
applying a primary framework, thereby forming conjectures as to what
occurred before and expectations of what is likely to happen now.’7
All these meanings of framing are relevant for explaining US and other
Western governments’ publicly stated attitudes towards Chinese hi-tech firms,
as we will demonstrate in detail below. Indeed, one of the most influential
frames of reference through which foreign governments tend to view China is
as a military, economic or sociocultural ‘threat’. A brief introduction to the
diverse sources of this ‘China threat’ frame will help to contextualise the case
of Huawei Technologies within the broader political discourse.
(1) The ‘China threat’ frame
Chengxin Pan has provided a detailed analysis of recent representations of the
‘China threat’, demonstrating the broad range of sources — from scholarly
works and government documents to popular culture and mass media — that
have viewed China’s ‘rise’ over the past three decades as a precursor to
conflict with Western powers, especially with the United States.8 Pan cites
typical headline-grabbing book titles, including Bernstein and Munro’s The
Coming Conflict with China and Peter Navarro’s The Coming China Wars;
and numerous media headlines painting an overwhelmingly negative picture
of China. ‘Job Losses: Made in China’, and ‘Tracing a Poison’s Global Path
Back to China’ are standard examples.9 Even academics with less
inflammatory views often make statements such as: ‘China would almost
certainly use its wealth to build a mighty military machine’,10 and ‘China [is]
a gathering multi-dimensional threat’.11
Pan notes that there are often links between the more hawkish ‘China
threat’ advocates and the American ‘military industrial complex’, with some
key US foreign policy think tanks either funded by the military or headed by
former military personnel.12 Pan and others have argued that the US military
has a vested interest in talking up the potential military challenge from China
5 See Merriam-Webster Dictionary, ‘frame’, at <http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/frame> (accessed 31 March 2015) .
6 G Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Intertext Books, London, 1972, p 187.
7 E Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 1974, p 38.
8 C Pan, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of
China’s Rise, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012.
9 Ibid, p 24.
10 J J Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, WW Norton, New York, 2001, cited
in Pan, ibid, p 28.
11 S Halper, ‘Wrongly Mistaking China’ (2007) 40(1) The American Spectator 20, cited in ibid.
12 Pan, above n 8, pp 72–6.
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in order to justify increased investment in major weapons systems and defence
contracts, especially since the previous threat from the Soviet Union has
diminished.13 Likewise, many US congressmen and senators represent
districts where defence industry contracts are vital to the local economy (and
to political candidates’ re-election efforts). They will have an in-built tendency
to support any perspective on China that sees increased defence spending as
vital to the US national interest.14
Added to the potential military ‘threat’ are equally powerful fears about
China’s growing economic might, and resentment about the perceived loss of
jobs to ‘China’ due to unfair competition and alleged currency manipulation.
One estimate by a group of US senators claimed that China’s ‘undervalued
currency’ had contributed to the loss of ‘2.6 million [American]
manufacturing jobs’.15
Finally, one should not underestimate the longstanding hostility towards
Communism and authoritarian governments that drove the United States and
its allies into the Cold War and still provokes the ire of many politicians,
especially in the United States. Any direct or indirect involvement of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in commercial investment overseas would
raise ‘red flags’ with such politicians, who are constantly vigilant about
Communist attempts to infiltrate and undermine societies in the ‘free world’.16
In Australia, similar fears have been expressed about China’s rise,
especially the risks of Australia being drawn into a regional conflict between
China and its Asian neighbours. Influential think tanks like the Australian
Strategic Policy Institute have called for greater military spending and closer
cooperation with the United States to prepare for this ‘threat’.17 There is also
frequent media commentary about Chinese corporations buying up Australian
agricultural land, pushing up food prices for consumers and potentially
threatening Australia’s food security; and claims that Chinese property
investors are inflating house prices to unaffordable levels in Sydney and
Melbourne.18
Part of this discourse may be based on fear of the unknown or anti-Asian
bias, as occurred when Japanese investors bought up great swathes of
13 Ibid, pp 74–5; and for a historical analysis of ‘invented’ justifications for US military
spending, cf I Hossein-Zadah, The Political Economy of US Militarism, Palgrave
Macmillan, New York, 2006.
14 Ibid, pp 71–2.
15 Ibid, p 27.
16 See, eg, comments about Huawei and ‘Communist China’ by Congressman Thaddeus
McCotter, ‘Communist China and CFIUS: “Dropping the Shark”’, 3 October 2007, at
<http://archive.redstate.com/blogs/rep_thaddeus_mccotter/2007/oct/18/communist_china_
and_cifus_dropping_the_shark> (accessed 31 March 2015)
17 See C McGrath, ‘Australia urged to up defence spending to meet threat from rising power
China’, ABC News, 11 June 2014, at <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-05-30/call-for-
review-of-australian-defence-spending/5487968>; and M Dal Santo, ‘Is a powerful China a
threat to Australia?’, The Drum, 27 May 2014, at <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-05-
27/dal-santo-us-alliance-could-be-our-china-fail-safe/5477528> (accessed 31 March 2015).
18 See A White, ‘China land grab hidden by “corporate veil”’, The Australian, 29 October
2013; and M Janda, ‘Chinese buyers to invest $44b in Australian real estate: analysts’, ABC
News, 5 March 2014, at <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-05/chinese-buyers-to-invest-
44-billion-dollars-in-australian-real-/5300494> (accessed 31 March 2015).
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Australian real estate during the 1980s.19 But it may also result from US
pressure. In the telecommunications industry, for example, the
Singaporean-controlled company SingTel was temporarily blocked from
taking over Optus in 2001, as US regulators were concerned about military
technology on satellites owned by Optus getting into foreign (ie, Singaporean)
hands. Because the technology was manufactured in the United States, it
required approval from the US State Department to ‘export’ it to another
country. Eventually the approval was given after SingTel gave undertakings to
safeguard any sensitive military information carried on the Optus satellites.20
With this combination of popular fears about China’s rise and external
pressure not to jeopardise the key US strategic relationship, it is no surprise
that the Australian government would prevent Chinese firms like Huawei from
bidding to supply the Australian National Broadband Network.21
Of course, these fears about the rise of China are not entirely groundless.
Double digit annual increases in China’s military spending budget have been
frequent over the past decade, even if the total amount still falls far short of
US military budget levels; and there are plenty of ‘hawks’ in the Chinese
defence establishment who openly declare that the United States and its Asian
allies are China’s main adversaries.22 China has territorial disputes with most
of those allies, including especially Japan, Taiwan and the Phillipines, and
these disputes frequently erupt into political rows and threatening gestures.23
There is certainly an element of what Pan calls ‘mutual responsiveness’, with
China’s military build-up resulting from its fear of US ‘containment’, and
correspondingly inflamed US suspicion of China’s motives.24
Whatever the fundamental causes of this increased mutual suspicion, it has
led to a situation where the US government’s own official defence reports have
concluded: ‘Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest
potential to compete militarily with the United States.’25 The congressmen on
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence would surely have
consciously or unconsciously been influenced by these widespread negative
19 See a historical account by A Rix, The Australia-Japan Political Alignment: 1952 to the
Present, Routledge, London, 1999, p 108. For a critique of the similar US perspective on
Japanese investment, see D Boaz, ‘Yellow Peril Reinfects America’, CATO Institute
Commentary, 7 April 1989, at <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/yellow-peril-
reinfects-america> (accessed 31 March 2015).
20 K Morrison, ‘US Spies in the Sky Stall Bid for Optus’, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 June
2001; and A Hyland, ‘Optus Stoush Leaves Singapore Smarting’, Australian Financial
Review, 2 August 2003.
21 See S McDonell, ‘China criticises Government’s decision to uphold NBN ban on telco
Huawei’, ABC Lateline, 30 October 2013, at <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-10-
29/china-angered-by-decision-uphold-nbn-ban-on-huawei/5056588> (accessed 31 March
2015). Ironically, one of the main beneficiaries of this decision has been SingTel Optus,
which has received the contracts to operate the Network’s two satellites: see National
Broadband Network Co, 2013–14 Annual Report, p 38.
22 Dal Santo, above n 17.
23 N Bisley and B Taylor, ‘Conflict in the East China Sea: Would ANZUS Apply?’, UTS
Australia-China Relations Institute Research Paper, November 2014, pp 12–15.
24 Pan, above n 8, pp 17–18.
25 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington DC,
6 February 2006, p 29; cited in Pan, above n 8, p 26.
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perceptions of China when they were asked to investigate the expansion of
Chinese hi-tech firms overseas.
(2) Other frames: ‘China Opportunity’ and ambivalence
Contrasted with the ‘China threat’ discourse is what Pan calls the ‘China
opportunity’ paradigm. This perspective combines an optimistic expectation
that China will open access to its enormous consumer market, with the hope
that opening up will lead to closer integration with the international
community, and ultimately perhaps democratic political reform.26 For those
who adopt this frame, the accession of China to the WTO in 2001 and its
greater involvement in global institutions are important milestones on the way
to China becoming a ‘responsible stakeholder on the world stage’.27 Clearly
advocates of this perspective would also strongly support free trade and
globalisation. Samuel Berger, the national security adviser under Bill Clinton,
expressed this point clearly: ‘Just as North American Free Trade Agreement
membership eroded the economic base of one-party rule in Mexico, WTO
membership . . . can help do the same in China.’28
Seen from today’s perspective, with one-party rule still firmly ensconced in
China, such optimism about political reform may appear misguided. But the
economic argument for promoting open trade with China is still very
influential in government and business circles. The more sophisticated
observers of China therefore tend to adopt an ambivalent attitude, or ‘bifocal
lens’, that remains wary of the potential Chinese ‘threat’ while simultaneously
promoting economic engagement and hoping for continuing reform and even
‘regime change’ in the future.29 Difficulties emerge, however, when these
various frames are brought into conflict with each other, as when a Chinese
hi-tech firm seeks to sell its products to US telecom firms or foreign
governments, or to acquire technology from overseas.
Deconstructing the PSC Report: The case of Huawei
Huawei is a highly successful communications technology firm, with its core
business focused on internet and telephone network hardware. It has business
operations or sales in over 170 countries, supplying some of the world’s
largest telecom and internet service providers, and over half of its revenues
come from outside China.30 The main challenge Huawei faces is that it has
effectively been excluded from much of the US telecom market, one of the
largest in the world. Other nations like Australia, India and Canada have also
prevented Huawei from bidding on major government contracts including the
Australian National Broadband Network, or selling equipment to
state-controlled telecom firms, citing ‘national security’ concerns.31 But are
these concerns justified based on the available evidence?
26 Pan, above n 8, pp 31–8.
27 Ibid, p 37.
28 Ibid, p 37.
29 Ibid, pp 38–9.
30 See information about the company on Huawei’s website at
<http://www.huawei.com/en/about-huawei/corporate-info/index.htm> (accessed 31 March
2015).
31 For Australia, see McDonell, above n 21; for India, see M Srivastava and M Lee, ‘India Said
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Assisting America’s enemies? Huawei or Hua-Mei?
The most serious allegation that emerged in the controversy leading up to the
PSC Report was that Huawei assisted America’s enemies by providing them
with sophisticated communications hardware that can be used in defensive
weapons systems. Since 2010, US senators have publicly accused Huawei of
supplying Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in the late 1990s, and the Taliban
in Afghanistan.32 These allegations are untrue.
After the Americans started enforcing a no-fly zone in Iraq in the 1990s,
there were several media reports claiming that Huawei’s communications
equipment had been installed as part of the Iraqi air defence network, thereby
threatening American lives.33 But those reports were incorrect, because the
actual name of the company involved was Hua-Mei (which translates as
China-America). This was a joint venture between an American firm and a
company controlled by Chinese military personnel called Galaxy New
Technology.34 Huawei had nothing to do with this joint venture or its
equipment at all: it was just a misreading of the name Hua-Mei by some
careless reporters! Unfortunately, the same mistake was still being repeated 10
years later in a letter by US senators to the US Congress, demanding that
Huawei be blocked from the US market due to its alleged ‘collaboration’ with
America’s enemies.35 As for Huawei supposedly supplying equipment to the
Taliban in Afghanistan, that turned out to be pure speculation as well.36
Because the allegations about Huawei in Iraq and Afghanistan were clearly
false, the PSC Report itself did not include them, but neither did it correct the
errors that had been publicly aired by US Senators. Instead, the PSC Report
to Block Orders for ZTE, Huawei Technologies Telecom Equipment’, Bloomberg, 30 April
2010, at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-30/india-said-to-block-china-s-huawei-
zte-from-selling-phone-network-gear.html> (accessed 31 March 2015); and for Canada, see
S Chase, ‘Ottawa set to ban Chinese firm from telecommunications bid’, The Globe and
Mail, 10 October 2012, at <http://www.theglobe andmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-set-to-
ban-chinese-firm-from-telecommunications-bid/article4600199/> (accessed 31 March
2015).
32 Iraq and Afghanistan are not mentioned in the PSC Report, doubtless because the evidence
of Huawei’s alleged wrongdoing in those countries cannot stand up to scrutiny, but several
US government officials have publicly made unsubstantiated allegations, for example, eight
Republican Senators sent an open letter to various government departments and media
organisations in 2010 claiming that ‘Huawei sold communications technology to Saddam
Hussein’s regime . . . and it also supplied the Taliban before its fall’. See Sen J Kyl et al,
‘Letter Requesting Information on Huawei’, 18 August 2010, United States Senate,
Washington, at <http://www.docstoc.com/docs/51224083/20100818-letter-to-Geithner_-
Locke_-Clapper_-and-Johnson> (accessed 31 March 2015).
33 Anderson, above n 3, pp 991–1000. See, eg, K Motz and J Richie, ‘Technology Two-Timing’,
The Asian Wall Street Journal, 19 March 2001, at
<http://www.iraqwatch.org/suppliers/techno-2time.htm> (accessed 31 March 2015)
34 The involvement of HuaMei is described in a report by the US Government Accountability
Office, ‘Export Controls: Sale of Telecommunications Equipment to China’, NSIAD-97-5,
13 November 1996, at <http://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-97-5> (accessed 31 March
2015). The American firm claimed it had no idea its Chinese partner was connected to the
military, but it should have known because the CEO of the company was an officer in the
People’s Liberation Army and her husband was a Chinese general! Anderson, above n 3, pp
1184–1230, gives a detailed account of this debacle.
35 Kyl, above n 32.
36 Anderson, above n 3, pp 1232–50.
40 (2015) 30 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
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implies that other abuses may have occurred, concluding that Huawei ‘did not
provide evidence to support its claims that it complies with all international
sanctions regimes’.37
The only evidence of Huawei’s ‘collusion’ with America’s ‘enemies’ in the
PSC Report related to Iran. The Congressional Committee expressed doubts
about Huawei’s claim that it had voluntarily suspended signing new contracts
in Iran to comply with international sanctions imposed since 2010.38 Huawei
certainly has been a major player in Iran in the past, selling its hardware to
upgrade the country’s phone and internet networks.39 But Huawei’s
competitors like Ericsson and Nokia Siemens Networks have been just as
active in Iran, selling similar kinds of equipment. Does that make these
European multinationals a threat to US national security too?40 The PSC
Report fails to note that Huawei was only one of several multinational firms
helping to upgrade Iran’s telephone and internet networks over the past
decade.
This kind of ‘framing’ — attempting to cast Huawei in the most negative
light through selective presentation of evidence and failure to correct prior
misinformation — is a feature that runs through the entire PSC Report. It is
particularly evident in the discussion of Huawei’s alleged ties to the Chinese
military and government.
Military ties?
The claim that Huawei has close ties to the military, repeated several times in
the PSC Report, also turns out to be speculation based on very shaky
foundations.41 It is true that Huawei’s CEO Ren Zhengfei was once a
relatively low-ranking officer in the Chinese military engineering corps.42 But
he left the army in 1983, and a few years later in 1987 set up a private business
selling simple telephone exchange switches imported from Hong Kong, which
later grew into Huawei.43 There is no convincing evidence that Ren Zhengfei
maintained any close connections with the Chinese military or that the
military has been involved in or exercised any influence over Huawei’s
business.
The story about Huawei’s military ties appears to have been sparked by a
37 PSC Report, above n 1, p 32.
38 For references to Iran, see the PSC Report, ibid, pp 32–3.
39 For contrasting reports on Huawei’s operations in Iran, see S Stecklow, F Fassihi and
L Chao, ‘Chinese Tech Giant Aids Iran’, The Wall Street Journal, 27 October 2011, at
<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204644504576651503577823210>
(accessed 31 March 2015); and Huawei Technologies, ‘Statement Regarding Inaccurate and
Misleading Claims about Huawei’s Commercial Operations in Iran’, 4 November 2011, at
<http://pr.huawei.com/en/news/hw-104191.htm#.U-xfk02KCM8> (accessed 31 March
2015)
40 For Nokia Siemens Networks, see C Rhoads and L Chao, ‘Iran’s Web Spying Aided By
Western Technology’, Wall Street Journal, 22 June 2009; for Ericsson, see S Stecklow,
‘Exclusive: Ericsson helps Iran telecoms, letter reveals long-term deal’ Reuters,
20 November 2012, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/20/us-iran-ericsson-
idUSBRE8AJ0IY20121120> (accessed 31 March 2015).
41 PSC Report, above n 1, pp 13–14, 21–2, 24–5.
42 Ibid, p 24.
43 See Zhang, above n 3, pp 23–4, 135, 223–4.
‘Framing’ Chinese hi-tech firms 41
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 48 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Tue Apr 21 11:41:26 2015
/journals/journal/ajcl/vol30pt1/part_1
reporter from the news weekly Far Eastern Economic Review, who visited
Huawei’s Shenzhen manufacturing facility back in 2000. He claimed to have
come across three large telephone exchange switches in Huawei’s shipping
warehouse addressed to the telecom bureau of the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA).44 Unfortunately the article did not provide any photographic evidence
to back up this arresting claim, or any details of the equipment’s
specifications. The only other hard evidence was a comment by Huawei’s
Senior Vice President Fei Min that the company did sell some standardised
equipment to the Chinese military, but it made up less than 1% of the
company’s overall sales.45 From this, the reporter concluded that Huawei was
a ‘military-backed company’.46
Such a speculative news article would normally have disappeared quickly,
but it gained a new lease of life in an influential 2005 report by the RAND
Corporation with the imposing title ‘A New Direction for China’s Defense
Industry’.47 The RAND report claimed that Huawei was part of a new ‘digital
triangle’ between the Chinese state, military and commercial IT industry, and
that ‘Huawei maintains deep ties with the Chinese military, which serves a
multi-faceted role as an important customer, as well as Huawei’s political
patron and research and development partner’.48 Unfortunately, the only
named source cited for these assertions is the same Far Eastern Economic
Review article from 2000 — which even at face value does not support such
wide-ranging conclusions about ‘deep ties’, military patronage or R&D
partnerships.49
Many of the media reports and government committees that continue to
raise these allegations about Huawei’s ‘military ties’ cite this RAND Report
without questioning the paucity of its source material.50 It is even relied on in
the PSC Report as the main ‘evidence’ by ‘many analysts’ of Ren Zhengfei’s
continuing military connections.51 The case for Huawei’s military ties must be
44 B Gilley, ‘Huawei’s Fixed Line to Beijing’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 December
2000, p 94.
45 Ibid, p 96. The reporter also cited unnamed ‘foreign analysts’ and a Russian assistant
manager at Huawei’s Moscow office to back up his claims of Huawei’s ‘military ties’!
Huawei has never denied that one of its customers is the Chinese military, but has
consistently maintained that such military sales have never made up more than 1% of its
overall sales. With the growth of its overall business, sales to the Chinese military now make
up only 0.1% of its overall sales, according to statements provided by Huawei to the PSC:
see PSC Report, above n 1, p 34.
46 Ibid, p 94.
47 E S Medeiros, R Cliff, K Crane and J C Mulvenon, ‘A New Direction for China’s Defense
Industry’, RAND Corporation, Arlington, VA, 2005 (RAND Report).
48 Ibid, p 218.
49 Ibid, pp 219–21 nn 17–20. The report also refers to some unnamed ‘interviewees’ in Beijing,
which is a long distance from Huawei’s headquarters in Shenzhen.
50 For example, J Dean, ‘Outside of US, Few Fear Huawei’, Wall Street Journal, Asian edition,
22 February 2008, at <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120359554277582713>
(accessed 31 March 2015); and Tech Law Journal, ‘3Com Huawei transaction to be
reviewed by CFIUS’, Tech Law Journal, 9 October 2007, at
<http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2007/20071009b.asp> (accessed 31 March
2015).
51 PSC Report, above n 1, pp 13, 48 nn 40–41.
42 (2015) 30 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
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extremely weak if this is the best evidence that a well-funded US government
committee can dig out.52
Government ties?
What about ties to the Chinese government? The PSC Report expressed grave
concern about the fact that Huawei has a Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Branch within the firm, and that Huawei’s ownership is not clear. They also
pointed out that Ren Zhengfei has been a CCP member since the early 1980s
and once attended a meeting of the CCP’s National Party Congress in 1982,
when he was still in the PLA.53 They treated this as evidence that Huawei is
being controlled and influenced by the Chinese government behind the
scenes.54
One major problem with this argument is that there are over 80 million CCP
members in China, and every large business firm registered in China must set
up a CCP Branch if requested by employees, as stated in the PRC Company
Law.55 Even American corporations like Walmart and Motorola have set up
CCP Branches in their Chinese subsidiaries. Does this mean that Walmart and
Motorola are being controlled by the Chinese government?56
Moreover, the CCP’s Charter makes it clear that the main role of the CCP
within non-state controlled business firms is to:
provide guidance to the enterprise in observing the laws and regulations of the state,
exercise leadership over the trade union, . . . rally the workers and office staff,
safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of all stakeholders and stimulate the
healthy development of the enterprise.57
The CCP Charter also specifically distinguishes between the role of the Party
in state-controlled enterprises and ‘non-public’ (ie, private) enterprises. In
state-controlled enterprises, the CCP Committees should ‘participate in
making final decisions on major questions in the enterprise’, but that is not
part of their function in non-public enterprises.58
One Walmart employee and CCP branch member explained: ‘Our Branch
Party Secretary told me that a major criterion for evaluating Party members’
progress is whether we have helped to increase sales at the Walmart stores
where we work.’59 Ren Zhengfei made a similar remark in a 2008 speech to
Huawei’s CCP branch members: ‘You are extremely important mentors within
52 Ibid, p 10, also refers to a ‘classified annex’ that the writers claim contains much more
evidence against Huawei, but this (conveniently?) cannot be published due to ‘national
security concerns’.
53 Ibid, p 23.
54 Ibid, pp 13, 22–4.
55 See PRC Company Law Art 19.
56 For more details on the role of the Communist Party Committees in corporations in China,
including foreign corporations like Walmart, see C Hawes, ‘Interpreting the PRC Company
Law through the Lens of Chinese Political and Corporate Culture’ (2007) 30(3) UNSWLJ
813 at 816–19.
57 CCP Charter Art 32, at <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/cpcbrief/constitution.htm>
(accessed 31 March 2015).
58 CCP Charter Art. 32.
59 J Min, W Zheng and Z Jianhua, ‘Zhonggong shouci zai woermafendianjianli dang zuzhi’
[CCP sets up Party organisations within Walmart for the first time], Xinhua News Agency,
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our company . . . and your role is to help your colleagues to realize that . . .
they chose a life of hard work and struggle, because firms like ours without
any established history can only survive if we work a bit harder than everyone
else’.60 While Huawei does not spell out the role of its CCP Committee in
detail, published statements by other privately controlled firms have made it
clear that the CCP supports rather than controls the management. For
example, Mme Lu Jun, the first Party Secretary of the privately controlled
Mengniu Dairy Group, stated that the Party organisation within Mengniu has
three main tasks: (1) to motivate the employees so that they become more
productive; (2) to regularly survey employees to find out what issues they are
concerned with and to seek their rational suggestions for improvements to the
firm’s processes; and (3) to investigate and root out corruption among the
firm’s employees.61 Clearly the CCP branches within privately controlled
Chinese firms today are more like employee motivation associations assisting
the management to improve firm performance rather than the overtly political
organisations of the past.62
Setting aside Huawei’s Communist Party Committee for the moment, does
the firm’s ownership structure itself conceal Chinese government control? It’s
true that Huawei’s structure is somewhat complicated, but a careful
examination shows that the firm is owned by its employees and controlled by
its management.
Ownership questions
Part of the complexity stems from Huawei’s history as a private business in
China, where private enterprises faced discrimination until very recently.63
Back in the 1980s and early-1990s, Huawei’s only customers were the big
Chinese state-owned telecom firms (in fact there was only one firm, China
Telecom, until the industry was partly deregulated in the late-1990s).64
Huawei had to do business with the local branches of China Telecom all over
China, and the only way to compete with state-owned equipment
manufacturers was by giving long-term incentives to China Telecom officials
and employees. Huawei set up a whole series of joint venture subsidiaries with
local telecom branches where the China Telecom branch would agree to buy
Huawei’s equipment, but it would be sold through the joint ventures, and the
26 August 2006, at <http://www.ln.xinhuanet.com/ztjnl2007-08/26/content_11295101.htm>
(accessed 31 March 2015). Hawes, above n 56, at 818–19.
60 Z Ren, ‘Jinqi zai canjia gongsi youxiu dangyuan zuotanhui shi fayan’ [Speech given while
participating in a recent symposium for Huawei’s outstanding Party members], 2008, copy
on file with author.
61 X Sun and Z Zhang, Mengniu neimu (Mengniu: the inside story), 3rd ed, Peking University
Press, Beijing, 2008, pp 263–4.
62 Hawes, above n 56, at 816–19.
63 For discrimination against private enterprises in China, see S Lin and S Song (Eds), The
Revival of Private Enterprise in China, Ashgate, Aldershot, UK, 2007, p 36; and J Zeng,
State-Led Privatization in China, Routledge, Abingdon, UK, 2013, pp 133–4. A more
nuanced account is provided in Y Xu, ‘Financing of Private Enterprises and Deepening
Financial Reform’ in Private Enterprises and China’s Economic Development, S Lin and
X Zhu (Eds), Routledge, Abingdon, UK, 2007, pp 51–73.
64 S Y Guan, China’s Telecommunications Reforms: From Monopoly towards Competition,
Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2003, pp 18–39.
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profits would be shared with China Telecom officials and employees.65 This
was not illegal at the time, though certainly a legal grey area.66 But in the late
1990s, the government restructured the telecom service providers to remove
China Telecom’s monopoly and create a market-oriented system, so Huawei
bought out all the joint ventures and adopted more orthodox marketing and
sales methods instead.67
China Telecom staff and officials never owned shares in Huawei
Technologies itself; they only had ownership interests in Huawei’s joint
venture subsidiaries. Instead, Huawei’s shares were initially owned directly by
its employees, with the company’s senior managers holding the majority of
shares.68 This was a clever way of retaining employees, because most of their
salary came from the profits on their shares, and if they left the firm, they
would forfeit their shares. Many employees called these shares ‘golden
handcuffs’, as they were worth a lot, but they tied people to the firm.69 The
problem was, once Huawei expanded very quickly and hired thousands more
employees, it became impossible for senior management to retain control with
their regular shares. This is because the PRC Company Law requires a
company with more than 50 shareholders to give each shareholder one vote
per share.70
So as part of Huawei’s restructuring in the late 1990s, the firm set up an
employee investment fund to acquire Huawei’s shares from its employees. In
return, the employees were allotted units in the fund instead of shares, which
did not give them direct voting power but allowed them to share in the
company’s profits.71 The investment fund was controlled by an employees’
representative commission, which cast votes in shareholder meetings on
behalf of the employees, but the CEO Ren Zhengfei had a veto over any
decisions made by the fund, including who would be appointed to Huawei’s
board.72 The employees’ representative commission currently consists of 51
members, the majority of whom are senior managers of the firm. This means
that even though there are currently about 84,000 Huawei employees who
hold units in the investment fund that owns Huawei’s shares, the firm is still
65 Cheng and Liu, above n 3, pp 76–8, 104–9; and for further details, see Y Wang, Langxing
guanli zai Huawei [Wolf-style management at Huawei], Wuhan University Press, Hubei,
2007, pp 283–6.
66 Zeng, above n 63, p 27.
67 G Li, ‘Can the PRC’s New Anti-Monopoly Law Stop Monopolistic Activities? Let the
PRC’s Telecommunications Industry Tell You the Answer’ (2009) 33(7) Telecommunications
Policy 361; Zhang, above n 3, pp 8, 38, 55.
68 Wang, above n 65, pp 101–2; Cheng and Liu, above n 3, p 110.
69 Cheng and Liu, above n 3, p 116.
70 With more than 50 shareholders, a company must normally be formed into a joint stock
company, which stipulates one vote per share: see PRC Company Law Arts 79, 104. With
less than 50 shareholders, a company can be formed as a limited liability company (LLC),
which allows flexibility in the way voting rights are divided up among shareholders: PRC
Company Law Arts 24, 43. The PRC Company Law was first introduced in 1994, and
Huawei was restructured from an employee-owned collective to a registered limited liability
company in 1997: see PSC Report, above n 1, pp 15–16.
71 The PSC Report gives a very useful detailed summary of Huawei’s employee share
ownership program based on information provided by the firm: PSC Report, above n 1,
pp 15–20.
72 Ren’s veto will last until 31 December 2018: PSC Report, above n 1, p 20.
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effectively controlled by its senior management.73
This ownership structure is certainly unorthodox, but was designed to get
around the inflexible rules on share voting in the Company Law.74 It wasn’t
done to hide the ‘true’ owners of Huawei. But the PSC Report seems to think
that somewhere in this structure government control is lurking.75 In the end,
however, the PSC Report was only able to make a weak finding that Huawei
was not completely forthcoming about its relationship networks with Chinese
government ministries, which is a long way from establishing Chinese
government influence over the firm.76
Intellectual property infringements?
Finally, the PSC Committee was clearly seeking to frame Huawei in the worst
possible light when they alleged that the firm was a serial IP infringer, stealing
ideas from its US competitors.77 Why was this relevant to US national
security? Because, they said, it tested whether Huawei was a ‘good corporate
actor’ and could be trusted with sensitive US communications infrastructure
contracts.78 This is another problematic argument, as it ignores the fact that the
two main IP lawsuits brought against Huawei by Cisco and Motorola were
both settled out of court.79 While the Cisco suit appears to have had merit, the
Motorola suit was much less clear-cut, and a single example of infringement
dating from 2003 is hardly evidence of ‘serial’ infringement.
Moreover, virtually all multinational hi-tech firms have been sued for IP
infringement or unfair competition by their competitors or by governments,
including Apple, Samsung, Microsoft, Intel and others. Some have even been
found liable in IP or anti-trust lawsuits in international and US courts.80 Does
that mean these firms are also too dishonest to be permitted to bid on US
government contracts?81
Fear of technological ‘back doors’
Despite the lack of hard evidence against Huawei and ZTE, the PSC Report’s
main concern is that somehow the Chinese government or military will
73 Information about the employees’ representative commission and the number of employee
unit holders is taken from Huawei’s 2013 Annual Report, pp 108–9.
74 Huawei gave this explanation in materials cited in the PSC Report, above n 1, pp15–16.
75 PSC Report, above n 1, pp 14, 21–2. The only solid criticism that the PSC Report could
make was that Huawei is not controlled by its shareholders but by its senior executives, but
this is no secret and does not prove any government control over the firm.
76 PSC Report, above n 1, p 22.
77 Ibid, pp 31–2.
78 Ibid, p 11.
79 See the detailed analysis of these disputes in Anderson, above n 3, at 1320–1585.
80 See, eg, Anon, ‘Samsung ordered to pay Apple $120m for patent violation’, The Guardian,
3 May 2014; C Arthur, ‘Microsoft loses EU anti-trust fine appeal’, The Guardian, 28 June
2012.
81 Some scholars have also noted that most countries go through a period of development when
they feel the need to breach intellectual property rights in order to catch up with more
developed nations. Only after reaching a certain stage of prosperity and technological
advancement do they then seek to enforce intellectual property laws vigorously. This
occurred in both the United States and Japan, for example. See D S Ben-Atar, Trade Secrets:
Intellectual Piracy and the Origins of American Industrial Power, Yale University Press,
2004.
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persuade or force these two companies to insert ‘malicious hardware or
software implants’ into telecom components or systems sold in the United
States, resulting in potential disruption of critical communications systems,
loss or theft of confidential data, and foreign government control over US
critical infrastructure.82 But this fear ignores the complexity of the supply
chain for these multinational hi-tech firms, whose products typically contain
advanced technological components assembled in over 20 different countries,
all of which would require adjusting to be compatible with any ‘malicious’
implants.83 Due to these insurmountable technical challenges, Chinese and
other foreign cyber-hackers have found it easier to infiltrate foreign
government and corporate networks at the user end rather than the
manufacturing end, and this has occurred despite the fact that most of the
victims were not using Huawei’s or ZTE’s equipment.84 There is no evidence
that excluding these two Chinese firms from the US and other markets will
help to prevent such cyber attacks from occurring in the future. Doing so will
only give a false sense of security to American and international consumers.
Reasons for suspicion? Locating the Huawei
investigation within the broader geopolitical and
theoretical framework
If the evidence against Huawei is so thin, why are the US government and
some of its allies so suspicious of this company? Why are they not celebrating
the great success of this Chinese private enterprise that has proved it can
compete with the best in the world? There are several factors, which we can
divide into two main categories: (1) the impact of Huawei’s own behaviour
and that of the Chinese military and government; (2) distorted frames adopted
by the US government and the international media when viewing Huawei’s
behaviour.
(1) Contextualising Chinese private hi-tech firm behaviour
Looking at Huawei’s actions first, the only way to succeed as a private
telecom equipment firm in China during the 1980s and ‘90s was to build
business alliances with local state-owned telecom officials, and even though
these joint ventures were sold off in the late 1990s, Huawei’s restructuring into
an employee investment fund ownership system then created a kind of black
box, allowing outsiders to speculate that it was hiding something about its
ownership. While the structure was adopted to allow Huawei’s senior
management to maintain control while complying with the PRC Company
82 PSC Report, above n 1, pp 2–3.
83 P Rossi, ‘Huawei’s End-to-end Assurance System’, talk given at a University of Technology
Sydney workshop on ‘Cloud Computing, Cyber Security and Privacy Protection in China:
Legal and Political Issues’, 12 June 2014. Note also that US firms producing internet
equipment for the US market, such as Cisco Systems, also manufacture some of their
products and components in China: see Cisco Systems, ‘Gongsi jieshao’ (Introducing the
Company), at <http://www.cisco.com/web/CN/aboutcisco/company_overview/about_
company_overview_overview.html> (accessed 31 March 2015).
84 For details of some of these cyber attacks, see n 94 below.
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Law, it has created the perception that Huawei is not transparent, which plays
into fears that the firm may be engaged in covert activities.
Huawei also downplayed the fact that the firm has a Communist Party
branch, saying that the Party has no influence over management decisions.85
Depending how ‘management’ is defined, this may be true, but Huawei should
explain more clearly what the CCP does in the firm, who Huawei’s leading
CCP representatives are, and how they interact with the firm’s senior
management. It is not difficult to find out from a brief web search that
Huawei’s CCP Branch Secretary is Zhou Daiqi, who is listed in the firm’s
2013 Annual Report as Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer and a member of
the Audit Committee.86 Neither his CCP role nor that of Huawei’s CCP
Committee are mentioned in the firm’s Annual Reports and it is not clear how
Zhou’s role as CCP Secretary interacts with his other executive
responsibilities. Other large private Chinese business firms include
information about their CCP branches on their Chinese-language websites or
in published profiles, including detailed descriptions of the CCP Committee’s
activities within the firm, and there is no reason why Huawei should not do
likewise.87 Having said this, the PRC Company Law and associated corporate
governance principles do not provide any rules about how to disclose the
CCP’s presence within Chinese-registered corporations, and firms are
essentially left to judge for themselves whether or not they should publicise
the work of their CCP Committees. Not surprisingly, most choose to say very
little, in case they unwittingly breach laws about revealing ‘state secrets’.88
The Chinese government needs to provide more guidance to privately
controlled business firms on what they can disclose about their CCP
Committees so that their opaqueness is not seen as suspicious evasiveness.
Huawei has also been so desperate to expand internationally that it has sold
its equipment in several countries that may not be enemies of the United States
but are certainly not allies, such as Sudan and Yemen.89 Though Huawei’s
interests are purely commercial, they should have realised the US government
85 PSC Report, above n 1, p 14.
86 See ‘Huawei dangwei shuji Zhou Daiqi: guojihua tui Shenqi tisheng jingzhengli’ (Huawei’s
Party Secretary Zhou Daiqi declares: Internationalization has pushed Shenzhen’s business
firms to increase their competitiveness), Shenzhen tequ bao, 23 November 2011, at
<http://tech.southcn.com/t/2011-11/23/content_33696313.htm> (accessed 16 January 2015).
Zhou’s role as Communist Branch Secretary is not mentioned in Huawei’s Annual Reports
or on its Chinese or English-language websites.
87 See, eg, the website of the electrical instrument manufacturer Zhengtai Group (CHINT),
‘Dangjian gongzuo’ (Party Building Work), at <http://www.chint.
com/partybuilding?sitePageId=49> (accessed 31 March 2015); and the Tengen (Tianzheng)
Group, ‘Wenming chuangjian’ (Building a Civilized Firm), at
<http://www.tengen.com.cn/sm2111111250.asp> (accessed 31 March 2015). Cf, the
description of Mengniu Dairy Group’s Party Committee in Sun and Zhang, above n 61,
pp 263–4.
88 This was the reason given by ZTE to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for
requesting that the list of ZTE’s CCP Committee members be kept classified: see PSC
Report, above n 1, p 40.
89 See Huawei’s website at <http://www.huawei.com/worldwide/index.htm> and
<http://www.huawei.com/en/about-huawei/publications/communicate/hw-087875.htm>
(accessed 31 March 2015). We also mentioned Iran, but as noted, Huawei was only one of
several multinationals doing business in Iran.
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would be suspicious about what they are doing there. This is especially true
because Huawei’s commercial interests have often coincided with Chinese
government interests in promoting overseas investment and building alliances
to secure access to natural resources. Indeed, having discriminated against
Huawei for many years,90 once the firm started expanding overseas and
became highly profitable, the Chinese government wanted to share in the glow
of its success as a world-leading Chinese business. They started assisting
Huawei by granting its foreign customers access to Chinese state bank loans
and guarantees — a practice that the US frowns on but is common in many
other countries that have export development banks, such as Canada and
Australia.91 Huawei’s CEO was also invited to join other leading Chinese
business executives on several ‘team China’ overseas trade missions.92 This
gave Huawei market leverage in many developing countries, but redoubled
suspicion in the minds of US Congressmen that the company was just a tool
of the Chinese government.93
More importantly, there is little doubt that elements of the Chinese military
have engaged in extensive cyber-spying against the United States and other
governments and against many multinational companies. For example, the US
Attorney-General recently brought criminal charges against five Chinese
military personnel involved in a special unit within the People’s Liberation
Army which, according to the indictment, hacked into foreign firms’ computer
systems and stole huge amounts of sensitive commercial and technical
information that would benefit Chinese competitors.94
Private Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE are not involved in these
activities, and despite the extensive US Congressional Committee
investigation, no evidence was uncovered to suggest that they have taken part
in any hacking activities whatsoever. The most that the PSC Report could say
was: ‘It appears that under Chinese law, ZTE and Huawei would be obligated
to co-operate with any request by the Chinese government to use their systems
or access them for malicious purposes under the guise of state security’.95 In
other words, they are potentially, rather than actually, guilty.
Finally, according to the PSC Report, Huawei has consistently acted in an
evasive manner, failing to fully answer questions or provide sufficient
documentation to back up its assertions about the independence of its
90 Zhang, above n 3, Ch 7, gives a detailed account of Huawei’s difficult struggle to compete
with heavily subsidised state-owned Chinese telecom equipment manufacturers in the early
1990s.
91 Cheng and Liu, above n 3, pp 103, 284–7; see also Huawei’s evidence as recorded in the
PSC Report, above n 1, p 28. For typical examples of how government export development
banks assist corporations in other countries, see the websites of Canada’s Export
Development Corporation at <http://www.edc.ca/EN/About-Exporting/Trade-
Links/Pages/financing.aspx> (accessed 31 March 2015); and Efic in Australia, at
<http://www.efic.gov.au/export-community/Pages/bankingandfinance.aspx> (accessed
31 March 2015).
92 Cheng and Liu, above n 3, p 285.
93 PSC Report, above n 1, p 29.
94 See Department of Justice, ‘US Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage
Against US Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage’, 19 May
2014, at <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/May/14-ag-528.html> (accessed 31 March
2015).
95 PSC Report, above n 1, p 3.
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business, and many of the documents it did provide were ‘unsigned copies’ or
otherwise incomplete.96 Here Huawei was well and truly ‘framed’ by the
Congressional Committee, in the sense of setting a trap to ensure the firm
would appear suspicious. After several lengthy meetings between Huawei
executives and Committee staff in 2011–12, at which Huawei responded to
numerous questions about its business and provided various documents, the
committee followed up with a letter to Ren Zhengfei in June 2012 asking for
‘clarifications’ along with supporting documentation.
For example, the committee asked for details of ‘every contract for goods
and services’ that Huawei or its subsidiaries had been a party to in the United
States, including details of the type of goods, price, quantity and location; and
copies of all recommendations provided to Huawei by international
management consultants in the past 15 years.97 Also, details of all Huawei’s
meetings or interactions with 10 different Chinese government ministries over
the past 5 years, plus details of a tax investigation of Huawei by the Chinese
government that occurred in 1999 (13 years earlier!), including the ‘date, time
and location of all meetings between government officials and Huawei
officials during the course of the investigation’.98 Several other requests for
clarifications were impossibly vague, such as: ‘Has Huawei ever been ordered
by the Chinese government to perform a task or seek information on behalf of
the government?’ and ‘Has a Huawei employee, whether with the consent of
supervisors or not, ever attempted to obtain private information from an
individual, company or government through Huawei’s network or equipment?
. . . Please provide all documents relating to these incidents’.99
All responses and documents had to be submitted, along with English
translations, within 3 weeks.100 For Huawei to have responded fully to this
request would have meant providing thousands of pages of documents, most
of which would need to be translated from Chinese, many involving
commercially sensitive issues that no company would publicly disclose.
Having placed this immense disclosure burden on Huawei with its
improbably tight deadline and vague parameters, the committee could easily
conclude that Huawei was ‘evasive’ and ‘unresponsive’ to some of its
questions, and this ‘lack of cooperation’ by Huawei is a major theme repeated
throughout the PSC Report.101
Distorting frames for viewing Huawei: Preconceived
perceptions among foreign governments and
international commentators
While certainly Huawei’s behaviour and that of the Chinese
government/military may have contributed to foreign government suspicion of
96 Ibid, pp v, 9, 12–13, 14–15.
97 For the letter requesting clarification and documents, see
<http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/HuaweiRen




101 PSC Report, above n 1, pp v, 9, 12–13, 14–15.
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the firm, there is no doubt that many US and Australian policymakers have
general perceptions about China that are influenced by the ‘China threat’
discourse. They will tend to interpret any evidence about Chinese hi-tech firms
in the most negative light, and downplay evidence that contradicts their
preconceived notions. We showed how the ‘China threat’ discourse has been
strongly advocated by high profile think tanks with ties to the US ‘military
industrial complex’, and supported by politicians with a vested interest in
sustaining defence industry jobs in their electoral districts. A typical example
directly relevant to Huawei’s case is the RAND report, on which many of the
conclusions about Huawei’s and ZTE’s ‘military and government ties’ were
based. This report was commissioned by the US Air Force,102 and in writing
it the RAND Corporation would be especially keen to adopt a hard line stance
on China, as one of their previous reports for the US National Intelligence
Council was rejected by then CIA Director George Tenet for failing to depict
China as a ‘clear and present danger’.103
The members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, who
passed judgment on Huawei and ZTE, would also have been influenced by the
CIA’s long history of covert collaboration with US hi-tech business
corporations. An early example was ITEK Corporation, which produced the
first high resolution camera for use in the CIA’s top secret spy satellite
program in the early 1960s. Jonathan Lewis describes how ITEK had to create
various front businesses to justify raising capital from investors for their secret
research and development work on the satellite camera.104 More recently, the
CIA has funded a venture capital firm, In-Q-Tel, whose mission is clearly
stated on the firm’s website: ‘We identify, adapt, and deliver innovative
technology solutions to support the missions of the Central Intelligence
Agency and broader US Intelligence Community.’105 Several of In-Q-Tel’s
leadership teams have links to Silicon Valley, including its CEO Christopher
Darby, and trustee James L Barksdale, a former CEO of Netscape
Communications and AT&T Wireless.106 In-Q-Tel claims to receive 10% of its
funding from US government agencies and 90% from private investors, and it
has already provided capital to around 97 hi-tech businesses in areas such as
cyber and mobile security, data analytics, and video and imaging.107
While the CIA is quite open about its involvement in In-Q-Tel, presumably
there are other classified projects involving US hi-tech firms that remain under
the public radar. The leaks by Edward Snowden in 2013 showed that the US
National Security Agency (NSA) had been tapping into the trunk lines of US
telecom and internet firms for many years, often with the secret cooperation
of those firms; and internationally, the NSA had managed to infiltrate the
102 See RAND Report, above n 47, front matter.
103 Pan, above n 8, p 81.
104 J E Lewis, Spy Capitalism: ITEK and the CIA, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2002;
reviewed on the CIA’s website at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol47no1/article08.html> (accessed
31 March 2015).
105 See In-Q-Tel’s website, at <https://www.iqt.org/> (accessed 31 March 2015).
106 ‘About In-Q-Tel: Team’, at <https://www.iqt.org/about-iqt/> (accessed 31 March 2015)
107 ‘In-Q-Tel Portfolio’, at <https://www.iqt.org/portfolio/> (accessed 31 March 2015) and
‘About In-Q-Tel’, ibid.
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online and mobile communications of numerous foreign governments and
corporations.108 While these revelations were not made public until after the
PSC Report on Huawei and ZTE was published, one can assume that the
Permanent Select Committee’s members were aware in broad terms of US
cyber intelligence gathering capabilities, and US government agencies’ active
collaboration with hi-tech firms. They would naturally assume a similar level
of covert collusion between Chinese hi-tech firms and the Chinese
government or military.
The Snowden leaks made it very clear that if China is involved in similar
kinds of cyber espionage, either through the equipment of private firms like
Huawei and ZTE or through specialised military intelligence units, it may
simply be adopting standard international practice. After the leaks were
published, a US government spokesperson tried to distinguish the NSA’s
conduct from ‘Chinese’ practices, claiming: ‘The NSA breaks into foreign
networks only for legitimate national security purposes.’109 Other reports
suggest, however, that the US government and its allies have not been so
circumspect, especially in the context of major commercial negotiations. For
example, the German chancellor Andrea Merkel protested strongly when leaks
revealed that the United States had tapped her personal cellphone during trade
talks; and Canada’s security agency allegedly hacked into the communications
networks of Brazil’s mining and energy ministry for commercial reasons
relating to oil exploration contracts .110 The Australian government also
caused a major diplomatic row with Indonesia when it emerged that
Australia’s intelligence agency had hacked into phone calls made by the
Indonesian president and used the Australian embassy in Jakarta to collect
both political and economic intelligence.111 Expert commentators noted that
Australia ‘is part of the Five Eyes intelligence gathering agreement between
Australia, the UK, the US, Canada and New Zealand’, and ‘there’s an
108 See the useful archive of articles on the Snowden leaks published by the Washington Post:
K Elliott and T Rupar, ‘Six months of revelations on NSA’, Washington Post, 23 December
2013, at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/nsa-timeline/> (accessed
31 March 2015)
109 Quoted in D E Sanger and N Perlroth, ‘NSA Breached Chinese Servers Seen as Security
Threat’, New York Times, 22 March 2014, at <http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html?_r=0>
(accessed 31 March 2015)
110 See M Birnbaum, ‘Germans launch probe into allegations of US spying’, Washington Post,
24 October 2013, at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/uproar-in-germany-continues-
over-accusations-that-us-tapped-merkels-phone/2013/10/24/39e4c618-3c96-11e3-b0e7-
716179a2c2c7_story.html> (accessed 31 March 2015); and S Ormiston, ‘Canada’s spying
touches nerve in Brazil’, CBC News, 15 October 2013, at
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/canada-s-spying-touches-nerve-in-brazil-susan-ormiston-
1.2054334> (accessed 31 March 2015).
111 See M Brissenden, ‘Australia spied on Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,
leaked Edward Snowden documents reveal’, ABC News Online, 5 December 2014, at
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-
documents-reveal/5098860> (accessed 31 March 2015); and A Henderson and G Roberts,
‘Indonesia says embassy spy claims “just not cricket” as Australian ambassador Greg
Moriarty questioned by Foreign Ministry’, ABC News, 2 November 2013, at
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-01/australian-ambassador-emerges-from-jakarta-spy-
claims-meeting/5064224> (accessed 31 March 2015).
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expectation that most embassies in foreign countries probably indulge in some
form of intelligence gathering’.112
In stark contrast with the Permanent Select Committee’s keen focus on
intelligence gathering programs was its rudimentary knowledge of Chinese
economic reforms over the past three decades. In particular, the committee
seemed to assume that all Chinese businesses must be state-controlled, either
directly or indirectly; and that a Communist government would not allow a
private business to become nationally successful. This attitude is apparent
throughout the PSC Report.113 But it overlooks the massive privatisation of
the Chinese economy that has been ongoing since the 1980s, involving
millions of business enterprises, to the extent that around 70% of Chinese
industrial output is now produced by non-state controlled business firms, and
over 80% of the industrial workforce in China is now employed in the private
sector.114 The committee was also blissfully unaware of the exponential
growth of mobile phone and internet use in China since the 1990s. In fact, the
number of mobile phone users in China grew from around 47,000 in 1991 to
over 1.2 billion by late 2013; and the number of internet users grew from
effectively zero in the early 1990s to around 632 million by 2014,115 which
provides a perfectly rational explanation for the expansion of firms that
service this market with their equipment like Huawei. Instead, however, the
committee assumed that Huawei and ZTE’s growth must have been subsidised
by the Chinese government for its own covert purposes.116 And the committee
wrongly stated: ‘Huawei operates in . . . one of seven “strategic sectors” [ie,
the telecom industry] . . . considered as core to the national and security
interests of the state’.117 This statement ignores the longstanding distinction
between Chinese telecom services, which is indeed a ‘strategic sector’ strictly
controlled by the state, and telecom equipment manufacturing, which has been
opened up to private enterprises since the 1980s. The fact that US competitors
112 See L Yaxley, ‘Foreign embassies expected to be used for spying: expert’, ABC News: The
World Today, 1 November 2013, citing ANU Professor Michael Wesley, at
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-01/foreign-embassies-expected-to-be-used-for-
spying/5064418> (accessed 31 March 2015).
113 For example, PSC Report, above n 1, pp 22, 24, 26.
114 For historical surveys of privatization in China, see S Yusuf, K Nabeshima and D H Perkins,
Under New Ownership: Privatizing China’s State-Owned Enterprises, Stanford University
Press, Palo Alto, CA, 2006; and Zeng, above n 63. For more recent statistics on the size of
the private sector, see V Koen, R Herd and S Hill, ‘China’s March to Prosperity: Reforms
to Avoid the Middle-income Trap’, OECD Economics Department Working Papers,
No 1093, 2013, pp 16–18 (OECD Publishing), at <http://dx.
doi.org/10.1787/5k3wd3c4219w-en> (accessed 31 March 2015)
115 Statistics for internet users come from China Internet Network Information Center, ‘34th
Statistical Survey on Internet Development in China’, July 2014, at
<http://www1.cnnic.cn/IDR/> (accessed 15 January 2015); and for recent mobile phone
figures, see Xinhua, ‘China’s Mobile Phone Users Hit 1.22 Billion’ Xinhua Online,
21 November 2013, at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-
11/21/c_132907784.htm> (accessed 31 March 2015). For earlier statistics on mobile phone
users, see Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, ‘2000 nian qian yidong tongxin
fazhan qingkuang’ (The development of mobile communications prior to 2000), at
<http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293832/n11294132/n12858447/12864552.html>
(accessed 31 March 2015).
116 PSC Report, above n 1, pp 27–8.
117 PSC Report, above n 1, p 21.
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of Huawei such as Cisco Systems have been able to sell large amounts of
network equipment to Chinese state telecom enterprises and government
institutions for over two decades underscores the relative openness of this
industry sector to private firms.118 In other words, there is nothing sinister
about Huawei’s and ZTE’s rapid growth when placed within the broader
context of Chinese economic reforms, the massive expansion of the consumer
market, and the privatisation of large swathes of the economy.
Whether or not these omissions and distortions resulted from lack of
knowledge or consciously biased selection, they certainly contributed to
narrowing the frame through which the committee interpreted Huawei’s and
ZTE’s behaviour and responses.
To be fair, such a one-dimensional view of Chinese industrial development
and corporate governance reform is not confined to US politicians. Many
popular accounts of the Chinese political system give the impression that all
corporations are controlled by the CCP. Richard McGregor, for example,
argues that all Chinese business enterprises work to mobilise the population
collectively towards CCP-designated goals, a system he calls ‘China Inc’, and
cites research suggesting that the ‘pure private sector’ in China is
‘minuscule’.119 Rowan Callick states that the CCP has ‘ultimate approval over
every investment, and branches in all state-owned enterprises and 85% of
private enterprises’.120 He also quotes Cheng Li, an American expert on
Chinese politics, as saying: ‘All the state’s assets are the Party’s in reality, if
not in theory.’121 And Martin Jacques declares that the Chinese government is
a ‘hyperactive and omnipresent state, which enjoys a close relationship with
a powerful body of State Owned Enterprises, a web of connections with the
major firms in the private sector, and has masterminded China’s economic
transformation’.122 The problem with this kind of analysis is that it downplays
the very real differences between the structures and management practices of
state-controlled and private firms. Certainly, the Chinese government is still
conflicted about the extent to which private enterprises should be allowed to
develop within a socialist economy — and rather than using the controversial
term siying qiye (privately-operated enterprises), the government prefers to
call them minying qiye (enterprises operated by the people), or fei gongyouzhi
qiye (non-state-owned enterprises).123 Yet as we noted earlier, there is still a
major distinction between state-controlled enterprises, where the CCP plays a
leading role in management decisions and hiring of executives, and private
firms, where the CCP is separate from the management and not directly
involved in the executive hiring process.
Interestingly, McGregor does also cite a comprehensive survey of Chinese
118 See Cisco Systems, ‘Gongsi jieshao’ (Introducing the Company), at
<http://www.cisco.com/web/CN/aboutcisco/company_overview/about_company_overview_
overview.html> (accessed 31 March 2015)
119 R McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Leaders, Harper Collins,
New York, 2010, pp 34, 197–-9.
120 R Callick, Party Time: Who Runs China and How, Black Inc, Collingwood, 2013, pp 142–3.
121 Ibid, p 43.
122 M Jacques, When China Rules the World, Penguin Books, London, 2012, p 615.
123 McGregor, above n 119, p 200; and see the CCP’s web page for ‘non-state-owned
enterprises’ at <http://dangjian.people.com.cn/fg/> (accessed 31 March 2015).
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private entrepreneurs by Bruce Dickson, which suggests that the influence
may be working in the other direction. Dickson concluded: ‘Party building in
the private sector has been more successful at promoting the firms’ interests
than exerting Party leadership.’124 But when the PSC Report cites McGregor’s
book, it only uses those parts that fit within the committee’s own frame of
reference. For example, ‘experts in Chinese political economy agree that it is
through these [CCP] Committees that the Party exerts influence, pressure, and
monitoring of corporate activities. It is therefore suspicious that Huawei
refuses to discuss or describe that Party Committee’s membership.’125
Likewise, the international media has perpetuated negative stereotypes
about Chinese hi-tech firms by repeating inaccurate stories long after they
were shown to be false. Virtually every article about Huawei in the
mainstream English-language media parrots the firm’s supposed ‘close ties’ to
the Chinese military and government without providing any new evidence to
support the assertions.126 Perhaps news editors find it more exciting to write
about cyber-spying rather than a highly successful private Chinese business
selling telephone and internet hardware, but this is negligent reporting and
merely reinforces the distorted frame of reference. Interestingly, the few
reporters who carefully read the PSC Report expressed strong doubts about
the committee’s cyber spying allegations against Huawei, and suggested the
underlying issue was more likely US trade protectionism.127
Conclusion
Privately controlled Chinese hi-tech firms are easy targets for governments
who want to show they are doing something about countering the ‘Chinese
cyber-threat’, even if excluding their products will have little impact on
stopping the hackers. US Congressmen and Australian/Canadian/Indian
politicians alike are clearly playing to their domestic voters. They think they
have nothing to lose and everything to gain by attacking Chinese firms selling
124 Ibid, p 219, citing B Dickson, Wealth into Power: The Communist Party’s Embrace of
China’s Private Sector, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
125 PSC Report, above n 1, p 23, citing McGregor, above n 119, even though McGregor is a
journalist rather than an ‘expert in Chinese political economy’, and no page number is given
for this opinion attributed to him.
126 For earlier accounts that mention the RAND Report or quote it without acknowledgement,
see J Dean, ‘Outside of US, Few Fear Huawei’, Wall Street Journal (Asian ed), 22 February
2008, at <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120359554277582713> (accessed
31 March 2015); and Tech Law Journal, ‘3Com Huawei transaction to be reviewed by
CFIUS’, Tech Law Journal, 9 October 2007, at
<http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2007/20071009b.asp> (accessed 31 March
2015). For a more recent article citing the PSC Report, see J Robertson, ‘The Chart That
Helps Explain Cisco’s 6,000 Job Cuts’, Bloomberg, 15 August 2014, at
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-14/the-chart-that-helps-explain-cisco-s-6-000-
job-cuts.html> (accessed 31 March 2015)
127 For example, P Dwyer, ‘Congressional Report on Huawei Smacks of Protectionism’,
Bloomberg News, 9 October 2012, at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-10-
08/congressional-report-on-huawei-smacks-of-protectionism> (accessed 31 March 2015);
and Anon, ‘Huawei and ZTE Put on hold: Two big Chinese telecoms firms come under fire
in America’, The Economist, 13 October 2012, at
<http://www.economist.com/node/21564585?fsrc=scn/fb/wl/pe/putonhold> (accessed
31 March 2015)
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mysterious internet technology and competing with US and other Western
corporations, especially if they can somehow link the issue to China’s human
rights record.128 Yet taxpayers certainly lose out when projects like the
National Broadband Network become significantly more expensive, as the
most cost-effective bidders are excluded from the competition.129 And just as
seriously, it appears that the Chinese government has started to retaliate
against Apple, Microsoft and other international hi-tech firms, restricting
purchase of their products by Chinese government officials due to ‘security
concerns’ about foreign infiltration of Chinese networks.130 Though not a
direct response to the PSC Report, these measures occurred soon after the
revelations by Edward Snowden that US hi-tech firms had cooperated with the
NSA in its cyber espionage programs, and that targets had included Chinese
servers and networks.131 There were even NSA documents revealing a plan to
‘exploit Huawei’s technology so that when the company sold equipment to
other countries — including both allies and nations that avoid buying
American products — the NSA could roam through their computer and
telephone networks to conduct surveillance and, if ordered by the president,
offensive cyber-operations’.132 It is not clear whether this nefarious plan
succeeded, but it reveals how ludicrous the situation has become, when the
Chinese firm being accused of (potential) cyber espionage by one arm of the
US government is the target of cyber espionage by another arm of the US
government.
Huawei has gone to great lengths to assure foreign governments that its
products are secure, and some countries like the United Kingdom have
welcomed the firm’s business after special monitoring safeguards were put in
place.133 But one can predict that whatever Chinese hi-tech firms like Huawei
do will be inadequate to convince the United States to welcome them with
open arms. Of course it is impossible to have a completely objective view of
the ‘other’, particularly when dealing with very different cultures and political
128 See, eg, C Frates, ‘Wolf Continues to Push Lobbying Firm to Drop Chinese Client’,
National Journal, 30 April 2012, at <http://www.nationaljournal.
com/blogs/influencealley/2012/04/wolf-continues-to-push-lobbying-firm-to-drop-chinese-
client-30> (accessed 31 March 2015), which links to an open letter from Congressman Frank
Wolf making a dubious connection between Huawei and Chinese human rights abuses.
129 See S Bevan and J Sturmer, ‘NBN review reveals cost blow out’ ABC The World Today,
12 December 2013, at <http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2013/s3910183.htm>
(accessed 31 March 2015)
130 US firms that have recently been excluded from bidding on government contracts for
‘security reasons’ include Apple (iPad and Macbook Air), Symantec Corporation, Kaspersky
Lab, and Microsoft (for its Windows 8 system). See K Rushton, ‘China bans officials from
buying Apple products’, The Telegraph, 6 August 2014, at
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/apple/11017019/China-bans-officials-from-
buying-Apple-products.html> (accessed 31 March 2015).
131 See Sanger and Perlroth, above n 109.
132 Ibid.
133 Huawei has cooperated with the UK government in setting up a cyber security evaluation
centre where independent technical analysts can test the company’s products for
vulnerabilities: see HM Government, ‘Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre: Review
by the National Security Adviser’, at <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/266487/HCSEC_Review_Executive_Summary_FINAL.PDF>
(accessed 31 March 2015).
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systems.134 But it should be possible to reduce the distortion in the frames
through more careful and open-minded investigation. At the root of the
problem is the deeply embedded psychological framework of mutual
suspicion between opinion leaders and policymakers in the United States and
China, and their consequent unwillingness to make the effort to reframe their
perspectives and gain a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of each
other’s behaviour.
134 Pan, above 8, pp 10–12.
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